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We consider the problem of sharing the cost of scheduling n jobs on m parallel machines
among a set of agents. In our setting, each agent owns exactly one job and the cost is given
by the makespan of the computed assignment. We focus on α-budget-balanced cross-
monotonic cost-sharing methods since they guarantee the two substantial mechanism
properties α-budget-balance and group-strategyproofness and provide fair cost-shares. For
identical jobs on related machines and for arbitrary jobs on identical machines, we give
(m + 1)/(2m)-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods and show that this
is the best approximation possible. As our major result, we prove that the approximation
factor for cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods is unbounded for arbitrary jobs and
related machines. We therefore develop a cost-sharing method in the (m + 1)/(2m)-core,
a weaker but also fair solution concept.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Motivation and framework: We consider the scenario in which a service provider owns a set of machines and receives
requests from agents to execute their jobs. Each agent has a non-publicly observable preference for his job to be processed.
He submits a bid to the service provider that indicates the amount of money he is willing to pay. If his job is processed, he
has to make a payment to the service provider. We refer to a payment as cost-share. The aim of an agent is to maximize his
utility, given as his private preference minus his cost-share. We assume that agents are selﬁsh. Therefore the provider can
generally not rely on receiving truthful bids, i.e. bids that equal the private preferences.
In our model, the provider’s cost of assigning jobs to his machines is given by the makespan, i.e. the time needed until
all machines have processed their assigned jobs. We consider machines to be related, i.e. the completion time of a job on a
machine does only depend on its workload and on the speed of the machine. The provider’s problem is to determine the
set of served agents, their cost-shares, and a valid assignment for the served agents. The provider would like to recover as
much of the cost as possible. Furthermore, he aims to minimize the makespan for reasons of eﬃciency and he wants to
prevent being manipulated by the agents. To be practicable, his problem has to be computable in polynomial time. Since his
scheduling problem is NP-hard in general, he has to apply approximation algorithms. The proposed scenario is of particular
importance for commercial computing centers as well as for the evolving commercial grid computing offerings.
We can utilize assignment algorithms to compute the assignment but need different tools for determining the set of
service-receiving agents and their cost-shares. To deﬁne the cost-shares, we apply a cost-sharing method. Two important fair-
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require that the cost-share of an agent can only decrease if more agents receive the service. The weaker core property
assures, that a coalition is always charged not more than the optimal cost of exclusively assigning the jobs of the coali-
tion. This implies that no coalition is overcharged. Furthermore, a cost-sharing method can be α-budget-balanced, which
guarantees that the service provider covers an α-fraction of his cost and assures the serviced agents that their collective
cost-share is not larger than the cost of an optimal solution. If it additionally satisﬁes the core-property, we say that it is in
the α-core. To determine the set of service-receiving agents, Moulin [27] proposes a cost-sharing mechanism which utilizes
a cost-sharing method. Given that the underlying cost-sharing method is cross-monotonic, this mechanism possesses the
signiﬁcant property of group-strategyproofness, demanding that an agent or a group of agents cannot improve their utility
by submitting untruthful bids. This keeps them from manipulating the service provider.
Contribution and signiﬁcance: The main contributions of this paper are results on cost-sharing methods that are both
α-budget-balanced and cross-monotonic. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the ﬁrst to introduce cross-monotonic
cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines. We prove that cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods that
are α-budget-balanced do not exist for α > (m + 1)/(2m), even for identical jobs and identical machines. However, we give
cross-monotonic methods with α = (m + 1)/(2m) for arbitrary jobs and identical machines or identical jobs and related
machines.
Our results show that, for arbitrary jobs and related machines, cross-monotonicity is “unfeasible”. We indeed prove
that it is impossible to obtain cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods that recover more than a 1/d-fraction of the cost,
and that it is possible to recover a 1/(2d)-fraction, where d is the number of different workloads. In order to achieve a
better approximation, we design a weaker but also fair cost-sharing method that is in the (m + 1)/(2m)-core. All proposed
methods run in polynomial time.
Related work: The assignment problem for related machines [13,15,17,19,20] has been extensively studied in the past.
Hochbaum and Shmoys [20] give a PTAS for this model. Our work frequently applies the LPT algorithm proposed by Gra-
ham [17] (we describe it in Section 2). LPT is optimal for identical jobs, achieves an approximation ratio of 4/3− 1/(3m)
for identical machines [17] and an approximation ratio of 5/3 for related machines [14].
Recently, this assignment problem has been considered in a game-theoretic setting where there is no central authority
that assigns the jobs. Instead, there is a set of selﬁsh agents that assign their own jobs to the machines. For this scenario,
one aims at computing an assignment in Nash equilibrium in which no agent can proﬁt by changing the assignment of his
own job (provided the assignment of the other jobs remains unchanged). For results on computing Nash equilibria, we refer
to the surveys of Gairing et al. [16] and Czumaj [8]. Fotakis et al. [12] show that LPT always computes a Nash equilibrium.
In a seminal result, Moulin [27] completely characterizes group-strategyproof mechanisms for submodular cost func-
tions. For these kind of cost functions, the cost that one user additionally incurs by joining a group of agents decreases as
the group size increases. He showed, that under natural conditions, cross-monotonicity is the only way to achieve group-
strategyproofness. Other partial characterizations are given by Immorlica et al. [21] and Penna and Ventre [31].
For submodular cost functions, there always exist cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods, e.g. the Shapley Value [32].
Remarkably, most known group-strategyproof mechanisms for non-submodular cost functions nevertheless rely on
cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods and use a simple mechanism given by Moulin [27] that guarantees group-
strategyproofness. Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods have been suggested for TSP, Minimal Spanning Tree, and Steiner
Tree [22,23], Steiner Forest [24,25], Facility Location [9,26,29], Multi-Commodity-Rent-or-Buy [6], Single-Source-Rent-or-Buy
[18,29], Set Cover [9], and Multicast [2,10,11]. Only the methods for Minimal Spanning Trees achieve budget-balance. The
budget-balance approximation factors for the other problems range from 2 to 30. Penna and Ventre [30] restrain cross-
monotonicity to the sets that the mechanism can actually output and achieve a budget-balanced and group-strategyproof
mechanism for Steiner Trees. Impossibility results on cross-monotonicity are given by Immorlica et al. [21]. The weaker
concept of the core is a well studied solution concept that stems from coalitional games with transferable payoffs and has
for example been considered by Shapley [32].
Results on strategyproof scheduling mechanisms in which agents own machines instead of jobs are obtained by Nisan
and Ronen [28], Christodoulou et al. [7], Archer and Tardos [3], Andelman et al. [1], and Auletta et al. [4,5].
Road map: Section 2 gives the basic deﬁnitions from mechanism design and deﬁnes the scheduling problem. Our results
on cross-monotonicity are given in Section 3. Section 4 concludes with results for the core.
2. Deﬁnitions
Let N be the set of n potential customers. The set of m machines owned by the service provider is denoted by M . Agent
i ∈ N has a private preference vi ∈ R0 indicating the maximum amount of money he is willing to pay for being served, i.e.,
his job being processed. If his job is processed such that he has to pay a certain cost-share xi ∈ R0, his utility is deﬁned
as ui := vi − xi . Otherwise, his cost-share and his utility are zero. In his request for being served, he submits a bid bi that
corresponds to the amount of money he is willing to pay. Since he is guided by self-interest, he chooses his bid such as to
maximize his utility. The provider experiences a certain cost by scheduling a set of jobs. We assume that this cost is given
by the makespan as deﬁned in Section 2.2. His problem is to determine a set of served agents U ⊆ N , their cost-shares
xi(U ) ∈ R0, that recover as much of his cost as possible, and a valid assignment for U . Throughout the paper, we use
[k],k ∈ N, to denote the set {1, . . . ,k} of integers.
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scheduling the agents’ jobs.
2.1. Mechanism design for cost-sharing
Let cA(U ) be the cost of a solution computed by some algorithm A to provide the service to U ⊆ N . In many cases, this
algorithm is an approximation algorithm to assure polynomial time. We write opt(U ) for the cost of an optimal solution to
provide the service to U . For a given set U ⊆ N , a cost-allocation function ξ : U → R speciﬁes the cost-shares of each i ∈ U .
It satisﬁes ξ(i) 0 for all i ∈ U . For U ′ ⊆ U , let ξ(U ′) :=∑i∈U ′ ξ(i). A cost-sharing method is a collection of cost-allocation
functions for every U ⊆ N:
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Cost-sharing method). A cost-sharing method is a function x : N × 2N → R satisfying for all U ⊆ N , that
x(i,U ) 0 for all i ∈ U and x(i,U ) = 0 for all i /∈ U . We will denote x(i,U ) by xi(U ). Let x(U ) :=∑i∈U xi(U ).
In this work, we consider three fundamental properties of cost-sharing methods and cost-allocation functions respec-
tively. The ﬁrst property, α-budget-balance, relates the overall cost-share to both the solution computed by algorithm A
and the optimal solution. The α-core property and cross-monotonicity can be interpreted as fairness attributes.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (α-budget-balance). A cost-sharing method x is α-budget-balanced for α  1 if it satisﬁes the inequalities
αcA(U )  x(U )  opt(U ) for all U ⊆ N . A cost-allocation function for U ⊆ N is α-budget-balanced, if the above condition
holds for U .
Ideally, we would like to have 1-budget-balance, i.e. cA(U ) = x(U ) = opt(U ) for all U ⊆ N . Observe, that dividing the
cost-shares by α results in cost-shares that guarantee the full coverage of the actual cost and an overall cost-share of at
most α−1 times the optimal solution. Although this is the more intuitive deﬁnition we use the deﬁnition given ﬁrst for
reasons of clearness.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (The α-core property). A cost-allocation function ξ for a set U ⊆ N is in the α-core iff it is α-budget-balanced
and in addition it holds, that for all U ′ ⊆ U : ξ(U ′)  opt(U ′). A cost-sharing method x is in the α-core iff for all U ⊆
N, x(·,U ) is in the α-core.
The α-core says that no group of agents is overcharged. Intuitively, no subset U ′ is paying for “the others”. A stronger
requirement is that the cost-share of an agent cannot increase if more agents are served. This is formally captured by
Deﬁnition 2.4:
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Cross-monotonicity). A cost-sharing method x is cross-monotonic if for all U ,U ′ ⊆ N,U ′ ⊆ U : xi(U ′) xi(U )
∀i ∈ U ′ .
It is easy to see that each α-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing method is in the α-core. From this we can
conclude that if there is no cost-allocation function for some set U ⊆ N in the α-core, then no α-budget-balanced cross-
monotonic cost-sharing method can exist. On the other hand, there can be cost-sharing methods that are in the α-core and
are not cross-monotonic.
With a cost-sharing method at hand, a simple mechanism by Moulin [27] may be used to determine the set of service-
receiving agents. First, collect a bid from every agent. Initially, all agents are considered to receive the service. Subsequently,
we remove all agents that bid an amount smaller than their resulting cost-share. After recomputing the cost-shares for
the remaining agents we repeat this procedure until all remaining agents may afford their cost-share or all agents have
been rejected. This straightforward mechanism becomes a powerful tool if endowed with a cost-sharing method that is
cross-monotonic. If the underlying cost sharing method is cross-monotonic, the mechanism by Moulin [27] guarantees that
a coalition U ⊆ N of users cannot collude and submit untruthful bids such that as a result, each of them has at least the
same utility and at least one of them has a strictly larger utility compared to the outcome that results if each of them bids
truthfully. This strong property is referred to as group-strategyproofness. Furthermore, the mechanism inherits the α-budget-
balance property from the cost-sharing method.
2.2. The scheduling problem
Let N be the set of n agents. Each agent i ∈ N owns exactly one job of workload wi ∈N. Accordingly, we will use U ⊆ N
to denote agents and jobs interchangeably. For a subset U ⊆ N , denote the sum of all workloads by W (U ) :=∑i∈U wi , and
the maximum workload of U by wmax(U ) := maxi∈U wi . Let d(U ) denote the number of different workloads in U . Moreover,
there is a set M of m machines. Each machine j ∈ M has speed s j ∈ N. We assume that s1  · · ·  sm . For M ′ ⊆ M , let
S(M ′) :=∑ j∈M′ s j . If all speeds are the same, we say that the machines are identical. Otherwise we call them related. Jobs
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have speeds and workloads of one respectively.
An assignment allocates each job to exactly one machine. For a given assignment, let δ j be the sum of the workloads
of the jobs assigned to machine j. Then the completion time of a job assigned to machine j is (δ j/s j). The makespan is
deﬁned as max j∈M(δ j/s j). We call the machines whose completion time is equal to the makespan makespan machines. The
optimal solution for a set U ⊆ N is an assignment with minimal makespan, denoted by opt(U ).
To compute an assignment, we apply Graham’s LPT algorithm [17]. LPT considers the jobs in decreasing order and as-
signs each job to a machine on which it experiences the smallest completion time (taking into account the jobs that have
been assigned already). Ties are resolved in an arbitrary deterministic way. For a set U ⊆ N we use lpt(U ) to denote the
makespan resulting from LPT, i.e. lpt(U ) := cLPT(U ). For an assignment for jobs U ⊆ N computed by LPT, let m(U ) be the set
of machines that are assigned at least one job. The running time of LPT is O (n) for identical jobs and identical machines,
O (n logm) for identical jobs and related machines, and O (n logn) otherwise. Even though there are better approximation al-
gorithms for the assignment problem [13,15,19,20], our main results cannot be improved by switching to another algorithm.
A nice additional property of LPT that we exploit in most proofs is that in each iteration, the current assignment is in Nash
equilibrium [12]. An assignment is in Nash equilibrium, if no agent can improve by deviating from the current assignment,
i.e. for each job i from the set of served agents U ⊆ N that is assigned to machine j ∈ M it holds that (δk + wi)/sk  δ j/s j
for all k ∈ M\{ j}.
There are some LPT speciﬁc assignment properties that we will use in our proofs. Lemma 2.1 states these properties.
Lemma 2.1. Let U ⊆ N and let Uˆ ⊆ U be the jobs assigned by LPT until the makespan ﬁrst occurs, including the jobs which forces the
makespan. Then it holds, that:
(1) For identical machines, W (U )/m opt(U ).
(2) For related machines, W (Uˆ )/S(m(Uˆ )) opt(Uˆ ).
(3) For related machines, if at least two jobs of Uˆ are assigned to some machine by LPT, then
lpt(U )
(
2|m(Uˆ )|
|m(Uˆ )| + 1
)
· W (Uˆ )
S(m(Uˆ ))
.
(4) For identical jobs, if at least two jobs of U are assigned to some machine by LPT, then
lpt(U )
(
2|m(U )|
|m(U )| + 1
)
· |U |
S(m(U ))
.
Proof.
(1) W /m corresponds to the makespan resulting from evenly distributing W over all machines.
(2) Let mopt(Uˆ ) denote the set of machines that an optimal assignment uses to assign Uˆ . In the case in which opt(Uˆ ) =
lpt(Uˆ ), it holds that W (Uˆ )/S(m(Uˆ ))  lpt(Uˆ ) = opt(Uˆ ). Now assume, that opt(Uˆ ) < lpt(Uˆ ). We show, that mopt(Uˆ ) ⊆
m(Uˆ ). Then we can conclude that
W (Uˆ )
S(m(Uˆ ))
 W (Uˆ )
S(mopt(Uˆ ))
 opt(Uˆ ).
Let w be the workload of the job that was last placed on the makespan machine. Consider a machine j /∈ m(Uˆ ). We
show that j /∈mopt(Uˆ ) and therefore mopt(Uˆ ) ⊆m(Uˆ ). It holds by the Nash equilibrium condition, that w/s j  lpt(U ) =
lpt(Uˆ ) > opt(Uˆ ). Consequently, the job with workload w is not assigned to j in the optimum assignment. Since w is
the smallest workload in Uˆ , no job in Uˆ is assigned to j in the optimum assignment. Hence, j /∈mopt(Uˆ ).
(3) For the sake of readability, we write τ = |m(Uˆ )|. Let w be the smallest workload in Uˆ and j be the makespan link on
which a job from Uˆ with weight w is placed. Then the Nash equilibrium conditions are δ j = lpt(U )s j and δl + w 
lpt(U )sl for all l ∈m(Uˆ )\{ j}. By summation,
W (Uˆ ) + (τ − 1)w  lpt(U )S(m(Uˆ )). (1)
Since w is the smallest workload of a job in Uˆ , and the set Uˆ consists of at least τ + 1 jobs, it holds that W (Uˆ ) 
(τ + 1)w . This leads to(
1+ τ − 1
τ + 1
)
· W (Uˆ ) lpt(U )S(m(Uˆ )). (2)
(4) This proof is similar to the above proof for related machines. The claim follows by combining Nash equilibrium condi-
tions which sum up to |U | + (|m(U )| − 1) lpt(U )S(m(U )) and the requirement |U | |m(U )| + 1. 
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In this section, we give α-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods that yield α-budget-balanced group-
strategyproof mechanisms if used as input for the mechanism by Moulin [27]. All proposed methods rely on solving the
assignment problem with m machines and n jobs via LPT. The property that LPT computes a Nash equilibrium is used
frequently.
We say that a cost-sharing method is computable in time f (m,n) if there is an algorithm that for each set U ⊆ N
computes the cost-shares {xi(U )}i∈U in time f (m,n). The mechanism by Moulin runs in time O (n · f (m,n)), since it has
to evaluate the cost-shares of all players for at most n subsets. As we assume, that the provider as well computes an
assignment for the selected players, the overall time to solve his problem is O (n · f (m,n)) plus the running time of LPT.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 propose (m + 1)/(2m)-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for the scheduling
problem with identical jobs and for the scheduling problem with identical machines. Due to Theorem 4.1 in Section 4, these
cross-monotonic methods achieve the best budget-balance factor possible.
Theorem 3.1. There is an m+12m -budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing method for the scheduling problem with arbitrary jobs
and identical machines computable in time O (n).
Proof. For a set U ⊆ N we deﬁne z(U ) := |{i ∈ U : wi = wmax(U )}|.
Cost-shares. The cost-sharing method is deﬁned as follows: for i /∈ U , let xi(U ) := 0. Otherwise, let
xi(U ) :=
{
wi/m if W (U )mwmax(U ) or wi < wmax(U )
z(U )−1(wmax(U ) −∑ k∈U
wk<wmax(U )
(wk/m)) otherwise.
It is an easy observation that xi(U ) > 0 for all U ⊆ N and all i ∈ U .
Budget-balance. Let Uˆ ⊆ U be the set of jobs placed by LPT until the makespan ﬁrst occurs. We derive an inequality
which will be utilized in this proof. For identical machines, if there are still unused machines, LPT places the jobs on
these machines. Consequently, if at least two jobs out of Uˆ are placed on one machine, then m = m(Uˆ ). In this case,
|S(m(Uˆ ))| =m, and by Lemma 2.1 we can conclude that lpt(U ) 2mm+1 · W (U )m .
Let W (U ) < mwmax(U ). Then x(U ) = wmax(U ). If at most one job from Uˆ is assigned to each machine, then opt(U ) =
lpt(U ) = wmax(U ) = x(U ). If at least two jobs of Uˆ are assigned to some machine, we know by Lemma 2.1 that lpt(U ) 
2m
m+1 · W (U )m . By the inequality W (U ) <mwmax(U ), we can conclude that lpt(U ) < 2mm+1 · wmax(U ). Thus, x(U ) > m+12m · lpt(U ).
Additionally, wmax(U ) opt(U ).
Now let W (U ) mwmax(U ). By Lemma 2.1, x(U ) = W (U )/m  opt(U ). If at most one job from Uˆ is assigned to each
machine, we conclude that x(U ) = W (U )/m  wmax(U ) = lpt(U ). If at least two jobs of Uˆ are assigned to some machine,
then according to Lemma 2.1, lpt(U ) 2mm+1 · W (U )m and thus x(U ) m+12m · lpt(U ).
Cross-monotonicity. Let U ⊂ N . We show, that if an agent k /∈ U joins U , then the cost-shares can only decrease for all
i ∈ U .
Let ﬁrst W (U )  mwmax(U ). Then, xi(U ) = wi/m for all i ∈ U . In case wk  wmax(U ), it holds that W (U ∪ {k}) 
mwmax(U ) = mwmax(U ∪ {k}). In case wk > wmax(U ), then wi < wmax(U ∪ {k}) for all i ∈ U . Therefore, all agents i ∈ U
continue to pay wi/m.
Now let W (U ) <mwmax(U ). An agent i ∈ U with workload wi < wmax(U ) will still pay wi/m if k receives the service.
Consider the cost-shares of the agents i ∈ U with wi = wmax(U ). It holds, that:
xi(U ) = z(U )−1
(
wmax(U ) −
∑
j∈U ,w j<wmax(U )
(w j/m)
)
(3)
= z(U )−1
(
wmax(U ) − 1
m
[
W (U ) − z(U )wmax(U )
])
(4)
= z(U )−1
(
wmax(U ) − 1
m
W (U )
)
+ 1
m
wmax(U ) > wmax(U )/m. (5)
If their cost-shares xi(U ∪ {k}) are wi/m, these agents will improve. Their cost-shares are not wi/m in the case that
W (U ∪ {k}) < mwmax(U ∪ {k}) and wi = wmax(U ∪ {k}). Then, wmax(U ) = wmax(U ∪ {k}) and wk  wmax(U ). For this case
Eq. (5) yields
xi
(
U ∪ {k})= 1
z(U ∪ {k})
[
wmax(U ) − 1
m
W
(
U ∪ {k})]+ wmax(U )
m
. (6)
Their cost-shares also become smaller, since the term W (U ∪ {k}) is larger than W (U ) and z(U ∪ {k}) ∈ {z(U ), z(U ) + 1}.
Therefore, cross-monotonicity holds. The running time is caused by the computation of wmax(U ),W (U ) and z(U ). 
Theorem 3.2. There is an m+12m -budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing method for the scheduling problem with identical jobs
and related machines computable in time O (n logm).
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αk := min
{
1,
αk−1ksk
(k − 1)sk−1
}
for k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}.
It can easily be proved by induction that αk ∈ {(ksk)/(lsl) | l ∈ [k]}∀k ∈ [m].
Cost-shares. The cost-sharing method is deﬁned as follows: for i /∈ U , let xi(U ) := 0. Otherwise, let
xi(U ) :=
{ α|U |
|U |s|U | if |m(U )| = |U |
1
S(m(U )) otherwise.
Budget-balance. Observe, that lpt(U ) = opt(U ) ∀U ⊆ N . Consider a set U ⊆ N with |m(U )| < |U |, i.e. LPT assigns at least
two jobs to some machine. Let τ = |m(U )|. It holds, that x(U ) = |U |/S(m(U ))  lpt(U ) = opt(U ). By Lemma 2.1, (τ +
1)/(2τ )lpt(U ) |U |/S(m(U )). The proposed budget-balance factor results from (τ + 1)/(2τ ) (m + 1)/(2m).
Now let us consider a subset U ⊆ N for which |m(U )| = |U |, i.e. LPT places at most one job on each machine. Let
τ = |m(U )|. By construction, ατ  1. Therefore it holds, that x(U ) = ατ /sτ = ατ opt(U ) opt(U ). Since lpt(U ) = opt(U ), ατ
corresponds to the approximation factor of budget-balance. Especially, ατ = (τ sτ )/(ksk) for some l ∈ [τ ]. If l = τ , 1-budget-
balance is achieved. Let l < τ . Since LPT places at most one job on each machine, (2/sl) (1/sτ ). Now,
ατ 
τ sτ
(τ − 1)sl 
τ
2(τ − 1) 
m
2(m − 1) >
m + 1
2m
. (7)
Cross-monotonicity. If |m(U )| < |U | for a set U ⊆ N , then for every set U ′ ⊇ U , |m(U ′)| < |U ′|, and furthermore S(m(U ))
S(m(U ′)). Therefore, the cost-shares for agents i ∈ U do not increase if more agents receive the service. The remaining cross-
monotonicity conditions for the case |m(U )| = |U | are:
α1
s1
 · · · ατ
τ sτ
 1
s1 + · · · + sτ . (8)
By the recursive deﬁnition of αk,k ∈ [τ ], the ﬁrst τ − 1 cross-monotonicity conditions are met. Indeed, the value of ατ is
(τ sτ )/(lsl) for some l ∈ [τ ]. Therefore, also the last condition of cross-monotonicity holds:
ατ
τ sτ
= 1
lsl
 1
s1 + · · · + sl 
1
s1 + · · · + sτ . (9)
The running time is determined by the execution of LPT . 
We have shown, that for identical jobs or identical machines, we can obtain (m + 1)/(2m)-budget-balanced cross-
monotonic methods. Unfortunately, by the central Theorem 3.4 of this paper, the approximation factor for cross-monotonic
cost-sharing methods is unbounded for arbitrary jobs and related machines. It depends on d(N), the number of different
workloads in the set N . Theorem 3.3 below deﬁnes a 1/(2d(N))-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing method for
arbitrary jobs and related machines.
Theorem 3.3. There is a 1/(2d(N))-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing method for the scheduling problem with arbitrary
jobs and related machines computable in time O (n logn).
Proof. Let U ⊆ N and w1 > w2 > · · · > wd(U ) be the different workload values in U . Furthermore, let U j := {i ∈ U |wi = w j},
for all j ∈ [d(U )] and S j := S(m(⋃k∈[ j] Uk)).
Cost-shares. If i /∈ U , let xi(U ) := 0, otherwise deﬁne the cost-share of agent i ∈ U j to be xi(U ) := w j/(d(U )S j) for all
j ∈ [d(U )].
Budget-balance. For j ∈ [d(U )] it holds, that S j  S(m(U j)) and additionally lpt(U j) = opt(U j). The following shows, that
the overall cost-share for all sets U ⊆ N is always at most opt(U ).
W (U j)
S j
 W (U j)
S(m(U j))
 lpt(U j) = opt(U j) opt(U ) (10)
and thus,
x(U ) = 1
d(U )
d(U )∑
j=1
W (U j)
S j
 opt(U ). (11)
To determine the approximation factor, suppose that wk is the workload of the smallest job that LPT assigns to a machine
l with δl/sl = lpt(U ). Let us only consider the instance with workloads of size w1, . . . ,wk . Then from the Nash equilibrium
conditions δ j  lpt(U )s j − wk for all j ∈m(⋃l∈[k] Ul) we conclude that
k∑
W (U j) lpt(U )Sk −
∣∣∣∣m
(⋃
Ul
)∣∣∣∣wk. (12)
j=1 l∈[k]
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⋃
l∈[k] Ul) machines, it is |m(
⋃
l∈[k] Ul)|wk ∑k
j=1 W (U j). It follows that
k∑
j=1
W (U j)
Sk
 lpt(U )
2
, (13)
and therefore
x(U ) = 1
d(U )
d(U )∑
j=1
W (U j)
S j
 1
d(U )
k∑
j=1
W (U j)
Sk
(14)
 1
2d(U )
lpt(U ) 1
2d(N)
lpt(U ), (15)
resulting in an approximation factor of 1/(2d(N)).
Cross-monotonicity: This cost-sharing method is cross-monotonic, since d(U ) and S j, j ∈ [d(U )] can only increase for a
larger set of agents. The running time is determined by the computation of S j for all j ∈ [d(U )] via LPT. 
Theorem 3.4. For the scheduling problem with arbitrary jobs and related machines, there is no α-budget-balanced cross-monotonic
cost-sharing method for α > 1/(d(N) + ), ∀ > 0.
Proof. We proceed as follows: we ﬁx a set of machines and consider classes of scheduling instances in which the job
workloads equal their speeds. Classes are deﬁned by specifying the number of agents and jobs of a certain job workload.
For average cost-shares on these instances, we derive properties that are met by all cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods.
Afterwards, we derive a bound on α-budget balance where α will be determined later.
Instances. The considered classes consist of instances with d := d(N) different workloads 1,a, . . . ,ad−1, with a ∈ N>1.
There are mj machines having a speed of ad− j with j ∈ [d]. Let m1 := 1 and mj := (a − 1)∑ j−1l=1 mla j−l for j  2. It holds
that mj = a2mj−1 for j  3. We use the more complicated formulation that simpliﬁes later arguments. For j ∈ [d], let N j
be the set of all agents with jobs of workload ad− j and n j := |N j|. Then, N =⋃ j∈[d] N j . For U ⊆ N , let U j := U ∩ N j . U j
extracts from U all jobs with workload ad− j . Let the proﬁle (u1, . . . ,ud) denote the class of all sets U with u j := |U j | for
all j ∈ [d].
Optimal assignments. First, consider the class (m1, . . . ,md). Obviously, for every instance of this class consisting of the set
of jobs U , opt(U ) = 1. Now change the jth entry of some ﬁxed j to r j = am j . We show, that opt(U ) = a for every instance
with the set of jobs U of the class (m1, . . . , r j, . . . ,md) for all j ∈ [d]. First, we give an assignment with makespan a. Then
we show that it is impossible to obtain a makespan smaller than a.
The assignment is computed as follows. Assign all jobs of workload ad−l , l ∈ [d] to the machines of speed ad−l . This
results in a completion time of one on machines with speed ad−l, l = j and a completion time of a on machines with
speed ad− j .
Now we show a lower bound for the optimal assignment. Assume, that there exists an assignment with makespan
smaller than a. Observe, that all jobs with workload larger than ad− j have to be assigned to the machines with speed larger
than ad− j . Now look at the jobs with workload ad− j . They can only be assigned to the machines with speed at least ad− j .
At most (a−1)mj of them can be assigned to the machines with speed ad− j . Now, all jobs of workload larger than ad− j and
the mj remaining jobs of workload ad− j have to be assigned to the machines with speed larger than ad− j . The makespan
cannot be smaller than a, because a lower bound for the optimal assignment for these jobs on these machines is given by a:∑ j−1
l=1 (mla
d−l) +mjad− j∑ j−1
l=1 (mlad−l)
=
∑ j−1
l=1 (mla
d−l) + (a − 1)∑ j−1l=1 (mlad−l)∑ j−1
l=1 (mlad−l)
= a. (16)
Cross-monotonicity. In the following, we assume that there is a cross-monotonic cost-sharing method x. Let Γ (m1,
. . . ,md) =∏dl=1 (nlml). For all instances of the class (m1, . . . ,md), the average cost share of the agents with jobs in Nk,k ∈ [d]
is
χk := χk
(
(m1, . . . ,md)
) := Γ (m1, . . . ,md)−1 ∑
U⊂N∀l:|Ul |=ml
∑
i∈Uk
xi(U ). (17)
Now change the jth proﬁle entry to r j = am j . Then, the average cost-share for agents with jobs in Nk is χk((m1, . . . , r j,
. . . ,md)). We will utilize cross-monotonicity to bound it from above in terms of χk . Let Γ = Γ (m1, . . . ,md) and Γ j =
Γ (m1, . . . , r j, . . . ,md).
Consider the set U j ⊆ N j with |U j | = r j and U j ⊆ U ⊆ N . First, let k = j. Every single cost-share of an agent i ∈ U j
for the set U is not larger than his cost-share for the set (U\U j) ∪ {i} ∪ U˜ , with U˜ ⊂ U j\{i}, |U˜ | = mj − 1. Especially, it
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( r j−1
mj−1
)
sets. Therefore an upper bound of
χ j((m1, . . . , r j, . . . ,md)) is given by:
χ
( j)
j := Γ −1j
∑
U⊆N
∀l = j:|Ul |=ml|U j |=r j
∑
i∈U j
∑
U˜⊂U j\{i}
|U˜ |=mj−1
xi((U\U j) ∪ {i} ∪ U˜ )( r j−1
mj−1
) . (18)
Now, let k = j. Every single cost-share of an agent i ∈ U\U j for U is not larger than the cost-share for i for (U\U j)∪ U˜ , U˜ ⊂
U j, |U˜ | =mj . Similarly, the following upper bound of χk((m1, . . . , r j, . . . ,md)) results:
χ
( j)
k := Γ −1j
∑
U⊆N
∀l = j:|Ul |=ml|U j |=r j
∑
i∈Uk
∑
U˜⊂U j
|U˜ |=mj
xi((U\U j) ∪ U˜ )( r j
m j
) . (19)
We now give a lemma on the relationship between the average cost-shares and their bounds.
Lemma 3.1. aχ j = χ( j)j and χk = χ( j)k for j ∈ [d] and k ∈ [d],k = j.
Proof. We ﬁrst look at χ j and χ
( j)
j , j ∈ [d]. Observe, that both sums are over the same subsets of Nl with ml elements for l ∈
[d]\{ j}. It therefore suﬃces to consider both sums for ﬁxed subsets Ul ⊂ Nl, |Ul| =ml, l ∈ [d]\{ j} only. Let U =⋃l∈[d]\{ j} Ul .
Deﬁne:
χ˜ j := Γ −1
∑
U˜⊂N j
|U˜ |=mj
∑
i∈U˜
xi(U ∪ U˜ ) (20)
and
χ˜
( j)
j := Γ −1j
(
r j − 1
mj − 1
)−1 ∑
U ′⊆N j
|U ′ |=r j
∑
i∈U ′
∑
U˜⊂U ′\{i}
|U˜ |=mj−1
xi
(
U ∪ {i} ∪ U˜). (21)
χ˜ j and χ˜
( j)
j are related to each other the same way than χ j and χ
( j)
j . Now,
χ˜
( j)
j = Γ −1j
(
r j − 1
mj − 1
)−1 ∑
U ′⊂N j
|U ′ |=r j
∑
U˜⊂U ′
|U˜ |=mj
∑
i∈U˜
xi(U ∪ U˜ ) (22)
= Γ −1j
(
r j − 1
mj − 1
)−1(
n j −mj
r j −mj
) ∑
U˜⊂N j
|U˜ |=mj
∑
i∈U˜
xi(U ∪ U˜ ). (23)
Eq. (22) is a simple combinatorial observation. To obtain (23), we investigate how often each subset of N j with mj elements
occurs. For each subset U˜ with mj elements, to determine a superset U ′ ⊃ U˜ with r j elements, we have
(n j−mj
r j−mj
)
possibilities.
Combining Eqs. (20) and (23) we get:
χ˜
( j)
j = Γ −1j Γ
(
r j − 1
mj − 1
)−1(n j −mj
r j −mj
)
χ˜ j = r j
m j
χ˜ j = aχ˜ j . (24)
Therefore, aχ j = χ( j)j for j ∈ [d]. With similar argumentation, we can conclude that χk = χ( j)k for j ∈ [d] and k ∈ [d]\{ j}. 
Budget-balance. Let us now assume, that x is not only cross-monotonic but also α-budget-balanced. We have seen that
the optimal cost for all instances of (m1, . . . ,md) and therefore the average optimal cost is one. With the same argument,
the average optimal cost of all instances in class (m1, . . . , r j, . . . ,md) for j ∈ [d] is a. Then we can conclude:
d∑
k=1
χk  1 and
j−1∑
k=1
χk + aχ j +
d∑
k= j+1
χk  aα ∀ j ∈ [d]. (25)
Summation of these equations yields α  a−1+dda . For every  > 0 and a suﬃcient large a, this results in α  1/(d+ ). Note,
that it suﬃces to consider the optimal cost instead of the LPT cost in Eq. (25). If an α-fraction of the optimal cost cannot
be recovered, in particular it cannot be recovered for a non-optimal cost. 
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Since an α-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing method is in the α-core, Theorem 4.1 tells us that the cost-
sharing methods deﬁned in the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 yield the best approximation factor possible. Theorem 4.2
provides us with a cost-sharing method in the (m+1)/(2m)-core for the scheduling problem with arbitrary jobs and related
machines. Because of Theorem 3.4, this cost-sharing method cannot be cross-monotonic.
Theorem 4.1. For the scheduling problem with identical jobs and identical machines, there is no cost-sharing method in the α-core for
α > (m + 1)/(2m).
Proof. We show that there is no cost-allocation function in the α-core for α > (m+1)/(2m) for the set U with |U | =m + 1.
Let U ′ ⊂ U , |U ′| =m. Assume, there is a cost-allocation function ξ : U → R for the set U in the α-core. Since ∑i∈U ′ ξ(i)
opt(U ′) = 1, there is an agent k ∈ U ′ with ξ(k) 1/m. Then,∑
i∈U
ξ(i) = ξ(k) +
∑
i∈U\{k}
ξ(i) 1/m + opt(U\{k})= 1/m + 1. (26)
For every approximation algorithm A, it holds that opt(U ) = 2  cA(U ). Now, the deﬁnition of α-core implies that 2α ∑
i∈U ξ(i) (1+m)/m, thus α  (m + 1)/(2m). 
Theorem 4.2. There is a cost-sharing method in the (m + 1)/(2m)-core of the scheduling problem with arbitrary jobs and related
machines computable in time O (n logn).
Proof. Let U ⊆ N . Let Uˆ ⊂ U be the set of jobs, that LPT assigns until the makespan is reached and let τ := |m(Uˆ )|.
Furthermore, we denote by mopt(U ) the machines that an optimal assignment uses to assign the set U .
To deﬁne the cost-sharing method, we look at two different cases. In the ﬁrst case τ < |Uˆ |, i.e. if the makespan ﬁrst
occurs, there is at least one machine that is assigned more than one job. Then, deﬁne xi(U ) := wi/S(m(Uˆ )) for all i ∈ Uˆ
and xi(U ) := 0 for all i /∈ Uˆ . In the second case τ = |Uˆ |, i.e. if the makespan ﬁrst occurs, LPT has assigned at most one
job to each machine. Let τ  3. We will consider the subcase τ ∈ {1,2} separately at the end of the proof. We deﬁne
A(U ) := S(m(Uˆ ))opt(U ) − W (Uˆ ). Let xi(U ) := 0 for i /∈ Uˆ . For i ∈ Uˆ , let
xi(U ) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
wi
S(m(Uˆ ))
if A(U ) < τ−1τ+1 · W (Uˆ )
wi
S(m(Uˆ ))−sτ otherwise.
We have to show for the given cost-sharing method x that x(·,U ) is in the α-core for all U ⊆ N . We start with the ﬁrst
case in which τ < |Uˆ |. The overall cost-share x(U ) is smaller than opt(U ), since by Lemma 2.1, x(U ) = W (Uˆ )/S(m(Uˆ )) 
opt(Uˆ ) opt(U ). Lemma 2.1 also provides the approximation factor:
x(U ) = W (Uˆ )
S(m(Uˆ ))
 τ + 1
2τ
· lpt(U ) m + 1
2m
· lpt(U ). (27)
Next, we show the core condition. Let U ′ ⊆ U . In the proof of Lemma 2.1 we show, that m(Uˆ ) ⊇mopt(Uˆ ). Therefore,
∑
i∈U ′
xi(U ) = W (U
′ ∩ Uˆ )
S(m(Uˆ ))
 W (U
′ ∩ Uˆ )
S(mopt(Uˆ ))
(28)
 W (U
′ ∩ Uˆ )
S(mopt(U ′ ∩ Uˆ ))
 opt(U ′ ∩ Uˆ ) opt(U ′). (29)
Consider the second case, τ = |Uˆ |. Let ﬁrst A(U ) < ((τ − 1)/(τ + 1)) · W (Uˆ ). Then, it holds that x(U ) = W (Uˆ )/S(m(Uˆ ))
opt(Uˆ ) opt(U ). Just like in the ﬁrst case, we can show that the core condition holds. Now we determine the approximation
factor. From A(U ) < ((τ − 1)/(τ + 1)) · W (Uˆ ), it follows that
W (Uˆ )
S(m(Uˆ ))
>
τ + 1
2τ
· opt(U ) m + 1
2m
· opt(U ). (30)
If A(U )  ((τ − 1)/(τ + 1)) · W (Uˆ ), then x(U ) = W (Uˆ )/(S(m(Uˆ )) − sτ ). Since we have that τ = |Uˆ |, it holds that
lpt(U ) = opt(U ) = wτ /sτ . The term A(U ) can then be written as A(U ) = (S(m(Uˆ )) − sτ )opt(U ) − (W (Uˆ ) − wτ ). We use
our assumption that τ  3 and therefore S(m(Uˆ )) − sτ  2sτ to show that x(U ) opt(U ).(
S
(
m(Uˆ )
)− sτ )opt(U ) − (W (Uˆ ) − wτ ) τ − 1W (Uˆ ) (31)
τ + 1
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S(m(Uˆ )) − sτ

(
opt(U ) + wτ
S(m(Uˆ )) − sτ
)(
τ + 1
2τ
)
(32)
 3
2
opt(U )
(
τ + 1
2τ
)
(33)
 opt(U ). (34)
Now we show the approximation. From w j + wτ  opt(U )s j for all j ∈ [τ − 1] we conclude by summation that W (Uˆ ) +
(τ − 2)wτ  opt(U )(S(m(Uˆ )) − sτ ). Since W (Uˆ ) τwτ , and therefore wτ W (Uˆ )/τ , we get
W (Uˆ )
S(m(Uˆ )) − sτ
 τ
2τ − 2opt(U )
m
2m − 2opt(U ) >
m + 1
2m
opt(U ). (35)
In the following, we show the core-condition. Let U ′ ⊆ U . If U ′ = Uˆ , then with Eq. (34), ∑i∈U ′ xi(U ) = x(U )  opt(U ) =
opt(U ′). Otherwise, (U ′ ∩ Uˆ ) ⊂ Uˆ . Since lpt(U ) = opt(U ), it holds that m(Uˆ ) = mopt(Uˆ ) and mopt(U ′ ∩ Uˆ ) ⊆ mopt(Uˆ )\{τ },
since an optimal assignment for a proper subset of Uˆ does not use the machine τ with speed sτ anymore. Thus,
∑
i∈U ′
xi(U ) = W (U
′ ∩ Uˆ )
S(mopt(Uˆ )) − sτ
 W (U
′ ∩ Uˆ )
S(mopt(U ′ ∩ Uˆ ))
(36)
 opt(U ′ ∩ Uˆ ) opt(U ′). (37)
We still have to consider the case in which LPT assigns at most one job to each machine until the makespan occurs and
τ ∈ {1,2}. If τ = 1, there is only one job 1 and we let x1({1}) = w1/s1. For τ = 2, let Uˆ = {1,2}, Uˆ ⊆ U . We only show
that we can determine x1(U ) and x2(U ) with an exact approximation such that the core condition holds. The core condition
requires x1(U )  w1/s1 and x2(U )  w2/s1. For the budget-balance, x1(U ) + x2(U ) = w2/s2. All these conditions can be
satisﬁed, since we meet the Nash equilibrium condition (w1 + w2)/s1  w2/s2. LPT determines the running time. 
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